Posted on 13th March 2019
What is HR?
In an instance of the Hospitals/Residents problem HR we have a set of hospitals H and a set of residents R. Each resident ranks a subset of hospitals in strict preference order and vice versa. Each resident may be assigned to a maximum of 1 hospital, whereas each hospital hj in H may be assigned multiple residents up to some predetermined capacity cj.
A matching M in this context is an assignment of residents to hospitals such that no resident is assigned more than 1 hospital and no hospital exceeds their capacity. Let M(ri) denote the hospital that ri is assigned to in M (if any), and letM(hj) denote the set of residents hj is assigned to in M. A blocking pair is a resident-hospital pair (ri,hj) such that ri is either unassigned or would rather be assigned to hj than M(ri), and, hj is either undersubscribed, or would prefer to be assigned ri than their worst assigned resident in M(hj). A matching M is stable if M contains no blocking pairs.
Extensions
- The Hospitals/Residents problem with Ties (HRT): An instance I of HRT extends HR by allowing preferences of residents or hospitals (or both) to contain ties, that is, a resident may be indifferent between one or more hospitals on their preference list (and vice versa). In this setting there are three possible definitions of blocking pair which in turn give rise to different stability definitions:
- Weak stability: A blocking pair (ri,hj) has the same definition as in the HR setting.
- Strong stability: Either:
- A pair (ri,hj) is a blocking pair of M if (1) ri is either unassigned in M or prefers hj to M(ri), and, (2) hj is undersubscribed or prefers ri to their worst assigned resident in M(hj) or is indifferent between them.
- A pair (ri,hj) is a blocking pair of M if (1) ri is either unassigned in M or prefers hj to M(ri) or is indifferent between them, and, (2) hj is undersubscribed or prefers ri to their worst assigned resident in M(hj).
- Super stability: A pair (ri,hj) is a blocking pair of M if (1) ri is either unassigned in M or prefers hj to M(ri) or is indifferent between them, and, (2) hj is undersubscribed or prefers ri to their worst assigned resident in M(hj) or is indifferent between them.
- The Hospitals/Residents problem with Couples (HRC): An instance I of HRC extends HR by allowing residents to apply to hospitals in couples. Each couple has a joint preference list in which they rank pairs of hospitals in preference order.